Sumanapal
Bhikkhu
The idea of ‘self’:
Can we think
without language? Nope. Language comes first ideas next to carry one’s idea.
And, in this context, this world is constituted by language. Kamala a little
girl was brought up among the tigers. She could only grunt. That is, she was
not brought up in the environment of the human language. That is the Namarupa
of Buddhist thought. Kamala could not develop any human consciousness. She had
some kind of animal consciousness. It may be said that humans are born with
consciousness primarily. Consequently we have human consciousness being born of
human mother and father. In this context Lacan and Julia Kristena could be
remembered.
When a body is inside another body the
former thinks that it is an inseparable part of the larger body. When the child
is born, it does not know that it is separate from its mother. When the mother
leaves it for some house-hold chores, the child finds that it is separate from
its mother and at once bursts into cries. And gradually it enters into
language. Below its learning lurks its craving for the unification with its
mother. Gradually the child enters into the symbolic import of language and becomes
aware of the world and its objects. The desire of the moth for the star and
night for the morrow crops up in the baby and he becomes a person like us
looking before and after and pining for what is not.
Lacan points out that when a child
is not that physically strong it sees its image on the mirror. The image
however looks well built and the child imagines that it is what his mirror
depicts; there is the rub. The child develops a fantasy about his self and the
ego develops in him.
I/we, you/you and she/he/they are all
that constitute the world for the growing child. The notion of I is very
elusive. It is almost like a striker of a carom board. When I speak, the ‘I’ is
with me. When your turn comes for speaking, you use the pronoun ‘I’. When a
third person’s turn to speak is there, he/she uses the pronoun ‘I’. So the self
and ‘I’ are different. The ‘self’ is however a fiction. It exists only through
its difference from other selves. If others were not there the self would not
be there. Self and self awareness are thus the function of the other and one
wonders whether consciousness is generated there from. But if consciousness could
be there, there must be an a priori receptacle or form of intuition in man
where consciousness could be born. Let us call it consciousness too.
What is consciousness?
It is very
difficult to define what consciousness is. The word consciousness first
appeared in English in the 16th century. It was derived from Latin conscious, con meaning together and
the verb scio meaning to know. Thus conscience originally
meant – to know together with knowing or knowledge with another. In Latin
however there was the phrase conscious
sibi or knowing with oneself. In other words, one could be conscious unto
oneself. And gradually the modern meaning of ‘consciousness’ is evolved. In our
context consciousness means awareness of something, referring an idea within or
without.
Consciousness in
the western concept:
Consciousness is the function of
mind Rene Descartes observed that man has both a body and a mind. While the
attribute of mind is thought, the attribute of body is extension. Descartes was
at a loss to explain how body and mind could be together. We posit that while
the mind is the witness of body, the body is the witness of mind. But there is
no third party that bears witness to either mind or body or to both. Neither
mind/consciousness is true nor body is true. Neither not-consciousness is true,
nor not-body is true. That may prompt to hold that neither
not-not-consciousness is true nor not-not-body is true and so on. These four
elimensional dialectics, as pleaded by Nagarjuna may be an imagery.
But in the contingent both body and
consciousness exist, however illusory they might be in reality. One’s body is
visible to other. But one’s consciousness cannot be demonstrated. It is not
verifiable in the world of objects. The human heart physically is not observed
but a cardio-surgeon observes when it is opened. But the consciousness of a man
cannot be demonstrated that way. If one studies the neurons one cannot guess
what feelings are evoked by the color red in an individual. Yet one is aware of
one’s consciousness. One is aware of one’s consciousness intuitively. In this
way one is aware of one’s consciousness; one is not aware of another person’s
consciousness. But when one hears what others speak the hearer can follow what
is spoken. The problem of consciousness is not only restricted to what a person
speaks. In course of ‘walking’, laughing and weeping consciousness functions
with awareness if the agent or speaker is a laughing one or a weeping one. So,
to study one’s consciousness one has to be inward. Study of consciousness has
to be subjective. The third person method of science cannot make any headway in
studying consciousness.
Now when one is inward and seeks to
observe his/her consciousness, one does not visually locate consciousness. One
finds one’s consciousness of something within. Generally consciousness is
relative. Consciousness is distracted from here to there. Right now John is
conscious of urgency to go to the office. Next moment he might be conscious of
a cry of a child. This is awareness of the urgency to go to the office followed
by the awareness of a child’s cry. And consciousness could be described as the attention
to countless sensations one after another. And that leads to countless
perceptions one after another and countless ideas one after another. Thus there
could be on the surface no consciousness but a stream of consciousness of
varied kinds in response to various subjective and objective factors that show
up in the world of appearance.
Consciousness in
the Buddhist psychology:
Buddhism has
elaborately discussed the different planes of consciousness in
1.
Consciousness
as experienced in Kamaloka.
2.
Consciousness
as experienced in Rupaloka.
3.
Consciousness
as experienced in Arupaloka.
4.
Consciousness
as experienced in the beyond of the above three.
Thereby
consciousness vijnana in the Buddhist thought is a wider term as dealt in
Abhidharma literature and in the Prajnaparamita sutra and in the Lankavatara
sutra etc.
In course of progressive
order of the 3 human minds, according to the Buddhist Abhidharma and Abhisamaya
psychological analyses consciousness would be inwardly experienced. Everyone are
directed by what Kant call one’s a priori forms of notions. An object is
perceived in Time and space contest by the individual. But as Kant points out,
the notion of time and space is what we add to the world. So this is a world
which we half-create and half perceive.
Now being
limited by the world and our discourse consciousness or awareness flowing along
a stream ever in flux as it were, we cannot vouch for a permanent self just as
there is no permanent objective world. Even one’s body is ever in flux. There
are ten trillion cells in an average human body. And cells die and cells are
born ceaselessly. But on the surface one’s body is the same and permanent
lingering through the decades. Here the surface is illusory. Permanent human
body is illusion. Lord Buddha has exploded the myth of the Permanent and
permanent self or atman. When there is no permanent self, there cannot be any
permanent objective world. Because if there is not the same John always, John
changing every hour, every minute, every second, the world perceived by John
also a second earlier and a second later becomes different. Now, through
meditation limits of time and space could be transcended.
If one avows anything as perceived in
meditation, that is subjective and on the surface un-scientific. In this
context His Holiness Dalai Lama could be referred to. His Holiness Dalai Lama
observes – unlike that of modern science Buddhism’s approach has been primarily
from first person experience. The comtemplationary method as developed by
Buddhism is an empirical use of introspection, sustained by rigorous training
and technique and robust testing of the reliability of experience. All
meditatively valid subjective experiences must be verifiable of both through
repetition by the same practitioner and through other individuals being able to
attain the same state by the same practice. If they are thus verified, such
states may be taken to be universal, at any rate for human beings. (www.
Shambhalasun.com).
Now there are four classes of
consciousness on the Arupaloka plane. They are
1.
Moral
consciousness aware of the infinitude of space. This is associated with
Kamaloka Rupaloka and this Arupalaka
2.
Moral
consciousness aware of the infinitude of consciousness.
3.
Moral
consciousness of being aware of Nothingness.
4.
Moral
conception of being aware of neither is nor is-not.
In other words consciousness on the Arupa-loka
plane transcends time and space, and everything in the world within and world
without turns into something elusive that baffles language.
Then comes the Lokottara consciousness
or consciousness beyond the world of the five aggregates or pancaskandha. It is
of four types-
1.
Consciousness
associated with the path of stream attainment
2.
Consciousness
associated with the path of once returning
3.
Consciousness
associated with the path of Never – returning
4.
Consciousness
belonging to the path of Arahatship.
The path consciousness is followed by
the perception of the timelessness, timelessness (Akalika) being one of the
attributes of Dhamma. The Abhidhamma Pitaka elaborately dwells on forty kinds
of transcendental consciousness. According to Dhammasangani the term
“Dhamma”are meant mind and body; it, therefore, deals with different states and
classes of consciousness and qualities of body of Buddhist Philosophy. According
to Patthana ‘in their zeal to do away with the of a permanent entity or the
Soul and grafting on it a new
personality wholly phenomenal, impermanent, law-determined and yet none the
less, able to effect a personal salvation, the Doctors of the Theravada
analysed sentient existence into Dhammas- like Khandha, Ayatan, Dhatu, Samkhara
and these have been brought together and their relation shown, by a verity of
permutations and combinations.
Thus like a lark that excelsior’s higher
and higher inward in the field of consciousness one finally reaches Nibbana
which is a state of nasanjna and naivasanjna or not-consciousness and
not-not-consciousness. This happens when Bodhi arrives. The notion of Bodhi
could be best understood in the context of the debate between Shen Xin and Hui
Neng –
While Shen Xin
posits-
The body is a Bodhi tree
The mind is a standing
mirror bright
At all times polish it
diligently
And let no dust
alight.
Hui Neng says –
Bodhi is fundamentally
without any tree.
The bright mirror is
also not a stand.
Fundamentally there is
not a single thing.
Where could any dust be
attracted?
It should be, however, noted that however
higher Man one reaches he is aware of the lower planes too. Hence those who
have attained the highest plane or Nibbana, those who are Buddha’s can move
about on the mundane plane, if they so desire.
The state of Nibbana, it seems is
charged with Buddha nature. As Hui Neng pointed out there is no south nor north
in Buddha nature, or Bodhi. Buddha nature admits of no distinction between
subject and object, self and the other. Everything that belongs to the world of
eyes and ears, and thoughts and ideas are the spontaneous manifestation of
Buddha-nature or Bodhicitta. Since Bodhicitta alone is, it is not. The
awareness of nothing is the true consciousness.
Apatisankhanirodha,
with no scope of arising mandane consciousness in arupajhana sanna vedayi
nirodha naiva sanna and nasanna the consciousness for knowing becomes non
related to objective world nor to subjective phenomena to be detectable. Under
such stand of consciousness it prevails with no response to objective world nor
that to subjective phenomena. Vasubandhu calls it Vijnaptimatrata and
Lankavatarasutra designates its Tathagata dhyana.
The present
author is greatly indebted to the savant and the Buddhalogist Prof. Suniti
kumar Pathak for this write-up.
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